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8.1 Introduction
The relationship between the size of a market and the structure of pro-
duction—the number of ﬁrms, their relative size, and the magnitude of en-
try and exit ﬂows—is determined by a large set of underlying structural
factors, including the competitiveness of the market, the magnitude of
sunk entry costs, the importance of economies of scale in production, the
relationship between production cost and product quality, and the magni-
tude of cost heterogeneity among producers.
A number of empirical studies in industrial organization have used
products that are sold in small geographic markets to study the cross-
sectional relationship between market size and market structure. Studies of
the relationships between market size, generally measured as population,
and the number of ﬁrms in the market (Bresnahan and Reiss 1989, 1991;
Asplund and Sandin 1999; Berry and Waldfogel 2003), the average sales of
the ﬁrms (Campbell and Hopenhayn 2005), and the magnitude of cost het-
erogeneity (Syverson 2004) have been used to indirectly draw inferences
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and Daniel Yi Xuabout these underlying structural factors, particularly the degree of com-
petition in the market.1 A common factor in virtually all of the empirical
literature is that they are based on a two-period long-run equilibrium
model that explains the number and size of ﬁrms as a function of market
size. Each paper tends to focus on the cross-sectional correlation between
one aspect of market structure and market size.
The data and theoretical framework used in these studies are not well
suited to examining entry and exit ﬂows or to identifying the role that sunk
entry costs might play in the evolution of market structure. More recently,
explicit dynamic models have been developed that generate a relationship
between market size and ﬁrm turnover (Asplund and Nocke 2006; Pakes,
Ostrovsky, and Berry 2007). These dynamic models distinguish incumbent
producers from potential entrants and recognize that, when sunk entry
costs are present, the value functions of the two groups are diﬀerent. This
makes an incumbent’s decision to remain in operation or exit diﬀerent
from the decision of a potential entrant and leads to a framework in which
market history, speciﬁcally past market structure, is a determinant of cur-
rent market structure. With the exception of Bresnahan and Reiss (1994),
the role of past market structure has not been examined in the empirical
market structure literature.
In this chapter we utilize data from the U. S. Census of Service Industries
to study the evolution of market structure in two health services industries,
dentists and chiropractors. We use data for the period 1977 to 2002 to doc-
ument a set of empirical facts linking the number of ﬁrms—and the ﬂows
of entering and exiting ﬁrms—to both market size and past market struc-
ture. It is particularly interesting to examine the market structures of
health service industries because the market demand is closely tied to pop-
ulation, so that market size should be important, and there are substantial
sunk costs involved in establishing a practice, so that the history of market
structure should also be a signiﬁcant determinant. The empirical results in-
dicate that past market structure, speciﬁcally the number of ﬁrms in the
market in previous periods and the number of potential entrants to the
market, play an important role in determining the ﬂow of entering and ex-
iting ﬁrms. Together these imply that market history is a signiﬁcant deter-
minant of current market structure, as the dynamic models of entry and
exit imply. The inclusion of lagged market structure also leads to a large re-
duction in the role of current market size and thus would have a signiﬁcant
impact on conclusions about market competition that are based on the
two-period long-run equilibrium models.
In the next section of the chapter we review the theoretical arguments
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1. Berry and Reiss (2006) summarize this literature and discuss the modeling assumptions
needed to separately identify the degree of competition in the market from other structural
factors, particularly the magnitude of ﬁxed costs.and empirical ﬁndings from the two-period long-run models and then con-
trast them with an explicitly dynamic model of entry and exit. The third
section summarizes the market-level data we utilize, focusing on the num-
ber of dentists and chiropractors in geographic markets in the U. S. The
fourth section summarizes the empirical model of entry and exit we esti-
mate, and the ﬁfth section presents the empirical results.
8.2 Models of Entry, Exit, and Market Structure
8.2.1 The Number of Firms
The primary model that has guided empirical work on entry and exit is
ﬁrst outlined in a series of papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1989, 1991) and
Sutton (1991). There are two time periods. In the ﬁrst period, a large group
of ex ante identical potential entrants make a decision to enter the market
after paying a ﬁxed cost to enter. In the second period, production occurs
and proﬁts are realized. The second period proﬁts are determined by the
nature of competition in the market (e.g., Cournot versus Bertrand versus
collusion) and the number of ﬁrms that entered in the ﬁrst stage. In equi-
librium, the number of ﬁrms that enter will be determined by a zero net
proﬁt condition; entry will occur until the second-stage proﬁts fall below
the ﬁxed entry cost. What Bresnahan and Reiss and Sutton show is that the
zero proﬁt condition can be used to guide empirical work explaining the
number of ﬁrms in the market.
In the simplest version of this framework, all ﬁrms in a market are iden-
tical. Let Z represent a set of exogenous market-level variables that deter-
mine demand and cost conditions in a market such as the number of con-
sumers and factor prices. Let V(N,Z) be the proﬁts earned by each ﬁrm in
a market when there are N producers. If   is the common ﬁxed cost of en-
try then the equilibrium number of ﬁrms N∗ can be described by two entry
conditions:
(1) V(N∗,Z)   and V(N∗  1,Z)    .
In a market with N∗ ﬁrms, proﬁts for each will cover the ﬁxed cost, while
in a market with N∗   1 ﬁrms they will not. Almost all empirical applica-
tions of this framework have used data on N and Z from a cross-section of
geographic markets to estimate parameters of the proﬁt function, particu-
larly the eﬀect of a change in the number of ﬁrms on proﬁts, and the ﬁxed
cost. If we assume that the ﬁxed cost in each market is an independent draw
from a common normal distribution for  , then the equilibrium entry con-
ditions imply an ordered probit model for the number of ﬁrms with Z and
any variables that shift the distribution of   as the explanatory variables in
the model. Berry and Reiss (2006) and Berry and Tamer (2006) discuss the
assumptions on V and   that are necessary to estimate the parameters of
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framework. In general, they show that if only N and Z are observed and
proﬁt data is not observed, then distributional assumptions on  and func-
tional form restrictions on V are needed to estimate the proﬁt and ﬁxed
cost parameters.
A particularly interesting special case, which has played a large role in
the empirical studies, is where the proﬁt function can be written as the
product of a per-customer proﬁt function VC(N,Z ) and the number of cus-
tomers S: V(N,Z )   VC(N,Z )S. In this case, S is interpreted as a measure
of market size and so cross-sectional variation in market size generates
cross-sectional variation in ﬁrm proﬁts. In this case, the empirical rela-
tionship between N and S can be used to draw inferences about the com-
petitive eﬀect of entry, that is, the eﬀect of Non the proﬁt function V, with-
out using proﬁt data. If this competitive eﬀect is present in a market, then
entry of additional ﬁrms into a market compresses the average markup of
all ﬁrms in operation, lowering V. At the entry stage the market size needed
to support an additional ﬁrm will be larger than if this competitive eﬀect is
absent. Alternatively, larger markets will support more ﬁrms but will also
have a larger average market size per ﬁrm (S/N).
This competitive eﬀect can show up in the market size correlations in
other ways as well. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) develop the implica-
tions of increased market size on the average size of ﬁrms in the market. If
larger markets are more competitive and hence have lower markups, then
average ﬁrm size will be larger because the ﬁrms must sell more output to
cover their ﬁxed costs. They ﬁnd evidence of this correlation in thirteen 
U. S. retail industries. Syverson (2004) incorporates ﬁrm heterogeneity into
the two-period framework.2 Firms are allowed to diﬀer in marginal costs
and he shows that competitive eﬀects can be reﬂected in the distribution of
costs or productivities in a market. In this case a homogeneous product is
produced by plants with diﬀerent marginal cost. Product diﬀerentiation is
introduced through the spatial dispersion of customers and the presence of
high transport costs. Together these make each producer’s output an im-
perfect substitute for the output of others. An increase in demand density
(the number of customers per unit of area) leads to an increase in producer
density, which, in turn, lowers prices and proﬁt margins for all plants in the
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2. A number of other papers have incorporated ﬁrm heterogeneity in the two-period frame-
work. In his study of airline markets, Berry (1992) allows for diﬀerences in ﬁxed costs across
ﬁrms and models the number of ﬁrms as a function of market and ﬁrm characteristics. He
ﬁnds that average ﬁrm proﬁts are negatively aﬀected by an increase in the number of produc-
ers. Mazzeo (2002) and Seim (2006) allow for diﬀerent degrees of product diﬀerentiation
across ﬁrms within the same market. Mazzeo models the number of high-quality and low-
quality ﬁrms in a market and ﬁnds signiﬁcant own and cross-eﬀects of the number of ﬁrms of
each type on the average proﬁts of each type. Seim allows ﬁrms to diﬀer in their geographic
location within the market and studies the location decision of new ﬁrms. She ﬁnds that in-
creasing distance between ﬁrms insulates them from the competitive eﬀects.market and raises the failure rate of high-cost producers. As a result, more
densely populated markets will be more eﬃcient, having a higher propor-
tion of low-cost producers. He ﬁnds empirical evidence of higher eﬃciency
in larger markets for the U. S. ready-mix concrete industry.
Asplund and Nocke (2006) move beyond the two-period framework and
develop a dynamic equilibrium model in which market size has implica-
tions for the rate of ﬁrm turnover. The underlying competitive mechanism
is similar to these other papers: an increase in competition as market size
increases results in large markets having more ﬁrms with higher per-ﬁrm
sales but lower price-cost margins. This results in the marginal surviving
ﬁrm being more productive in larger markets, which is reﬂected in higher
turnover and a younger age distribution of ﬁrms in larger markets. They
ﬁnd empirical evidence supporting this for Swedish hair salons.
8.2.2 Entry and Exit Flows
With the exception of Asplund and Nocke (2006), the empirical litera-
ture summarized in section 8.2.1 focuses on long-run diﬀerences in the
number of ﬁrms, not on entry and exit ﬂows directly. While the underlying
two-period framework can allow for producer heterogeneity in ﬁxed costs
or proﬁts, which leads one ﬁrm to choose to be in the market while another
chooses to be out, it does not provide any insights into what determines the
magnitude of entry and exit ﬂows. One aspect that is generally missed in the
two-period model is the distinction between the role of ﬁxed costs that all
producers pay and the role of sunk entry costs that are only paid by ﬁrms
at the time of entry.3This leads to a diﬀerence in the objective function and
participation decision of incumbent and potential entrant ﬁrms. Incum-
bents compare the expected sum of discounted future proﬁts with the scrap
value they would earn by liquidating the ﬁrm. In contrast, potential en-
trants compare the discounted future payoﬀ from entering with the sunk
entry cost they must incur. This distinction has important implications for
the way that the number of ﬁrms responds to exogenous factors that
change proﬁts.
Sunk entry costs combined with uncertainty about future market condi-
tions gives rise to hysteresis in market structure (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
For example, suppose there is an exogenous increase in market size that
raises ﬁrm proﬁts suﬃciently to induce potential entrants to pay the sunk
cost and enter the market. If the market size and proﬁts then return to their
initial levels, those new ﬁrms may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to remain in operation
rather than exit. The number of ﬁrms thus responds asymmetrically to
changes in market size. Equivalently, the history of market structure, and
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3. Berry (1992) allows the ﬁxed cost of an airline on a route to depend on whether or not
the airline had a presence at the endpoint cities, which distinguishes incumbents from poten-
tial entrants in the endpoint markets.not just current and future proﬁt determinants, matters in explaining the
current number of ﬁrms.
The level of the sunk entry cost also aﬀects the magnitude of entry and
exit ﬂows in the market. Using a competitive, industry-equilibrium model,
Hopenhayn (1992) shows that an increase in the sunk entry cost will reduce
the ﬂow of entering ﬁrms in the market but also reduce the ﬂow of exiting
ﬁrms. The higher entry cost acts to insulate incumbent ﬁrms from the pres-
sure of entry and allows more ineﬃcient incumbents to survive. Thus, the
entry cost is an important structural element aﬀecting entry and exit ﬂows
and the degree of market eﬃciency.
Recently, fully dynamic models that recognize the distinction between
incumbent and potential entrant ﬁrms have been developed that can ex-
plain diﬀerences in entry and exit ﬂows across markets and/or industries.
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007),
Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007), Collard-Wexler (2006), and Ryan (2006)
all use micro data on ﬁrm participation patterns in a market to estimate
structural models of entry and exit, including the sunk costs of entry.
Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) develop a dynamic model that is very
useful as a framework for studying the ﬂows of entering and exiting ﬁrms
in market-level data. This leads to a formulation for regressions of entry,
exit, and the number of ﬁrms that can be distinguished from the two-period
models but estimated with the same type of cross-sectional or panel market-
level data. We will brieﬂy summarize this model and then use it to specify
regression models of entry and exit.
The model assumes that in a market each ﬁrm earns identical proﬁts
given by  (N,Z) where N is the number of ﬁrms that operate in the period
and Z is a set of exogenous cost and demand shifters. The state variables Z
evolve exogenously over time as market conditions change, while Nevolves
endogenously as ﬁrms make optimal entry and exit decisions. In each pe-
riod an incumbent faces a choice of remaining in the market in the next
period or exiting. If ﬁrm i chooses to exit they earn a scrap value  i, which 
is modeled as an independent draw from an underlying distribution 
F (• |  ) where  is a parameter that characterizes the distribution. The dis-
tribution is common for all ﬁrms and time periods. If they remain in they
earn expected proﬁts VC(N,Z,  ), which is the expectation of the ﬁrm
value in the next period and is identical for all incumbents in the market.4
Incumbent ﬁrm ichooses to remain in the market if VC(N,Z, )    i. Sim-
ilarly, each potential entrant faces a decision to enter at the start of the next
period. The payoﬀ from entering is represented as VE(N,Z, ) and is the
same for all potential entrants in the market. Each potential entrant diﬀers
in their entry cost  i, which is modeled as an independent draw from a com-
mon distribution F (• |  ), where the parameter   characterizes the entry
cost distribution. The ﬁrm enters the market if VE(N,Z, )   i.
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4. The expectation is over the future values of the state variables N, Z, and the scrap value  .This framework diﬀers from the two-period model outlined above in
several important ways. First, incumbents and potential entrants diﬀer.
The latter must pay an entry cost, but also the expected ﬁrm value from
continuing in production VC is diﬀerent than the expected ﬁrm value from
entering VE.5 Second, ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, which is absent from the
simplest two-period models, is introduced through the random scrap value
and entry cost. This model is capable of generating simultaneous ﬂows of
entering and exiting ﬁrms into the same market, something that simpler
models with homogenous ﬁrms cannot do.
This model results in simple expressions for the probability of entry and
exit. The probability an incumbent ﬁrm exits from a market with current
state N,Z is given by:
(2) PX(N,Z, )   Prob [VC(N,Z, )    ]   1   F [VC(N,Z, )| ].
Since this probability is the same for all incumbents in the market, the num-
bering of exiting ﬁrms NX is a binomial random variable with the param-
eters PXand N, where the number of incumbent ﬁrms is the number of trials
in the process.
Similarly, the number of entering ﬁrms is also a binomial random variable.
The probability of one ﬁrm entering the market with current state (N, Z) is:
(3) PE(N,Z, , )   Prob [VE(N,Z, )    ]   F [VE(N,Z, )| ].
This probability is the same for all potential entrants to the market, so the
number of entering ﬁrms NE is a binomial random variable with parame-
ters PEand NPE, where the latter is the number of potential entrants to the
market.
To summarize, the theoretical model provides a basis for a statistical
model of the number of entering and exiting ﬁrms in a market. The entry
and exit ﬂows (NX and NE) over a time period are a function of exogenous
state variables Z that aﬀect proﬁts in the beginning time period (and deter-
mine values in future time periods) and the number of ﬁrms N and number
of potential entrants NPE at the beginning of the period. In section 8.4 we
estimate equations for the entry and exit ﬂows based on this speciﬁcation.
8.3 Measuring Entry and Exit for Dentists and 
Chiropractors Using Census Data
The data used in the analysis are from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longi-
tudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD contains establishment-level
data on all employers in the United States from 1976 through 2005. The
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5. VE(N,Z, ) and VC(N,Z, ) are not identical. The former is the expected ﬁrm value from
the perspective of a ﬁrm that chooses to enter, and thus knows there is at least one entering
ﬁrm in the market. The latter is the expected ﬁrm value from the perspective of an incumbent
that chooses to remain in the market and thus knows there is at least one survivor. Each group
thus has a diﬀerent expectation for the number of ﬁrms N in the market in future periods.database allows for the measurement of establishment and ﬁrm dynamics
across almost all sectors of the U. S. economy.6 While prior research fo-
cused primarily on the analysis of ﬁrm dynamics in the manufacturing sec-
tor, the recent development of nonmanufacturing data allows for the anal-
ysis of producer turnover across a much wider range of industries.
In this chapter, we examine entry and exit in two health services indus-
tries—dentists (NAICS 621210) and chiropractors (NAICS 621310)—
where little is known about the patterns of ﬁrm dynamics. Dental and 
chiropractic services are dominated by small, single location ﬁrms typi-
cally owned by the practicing doctor(s). While Census data collection is 
establishment-based, for these industries virtually all ﬁrms are single es-
tablishment practices, particularly in the small markets we will utilize, and
we use the terms interchangeably in this chapter. These ﬁrms provide their
services in relatively small markets with the demand for services tied closely
to local market conditions, particularly population. The technologies are
also similar across dental and chiropractic establishments in that they com-
bine oﬃce staﬀ, specialized capital equipment, and doctors’ time to provide
health services. Our analysis augments the LBD with revenue, payroll, em-
ployment, and geographic coding data from the Census of Services, limit-
ing the data set to the Census years of 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and
2002. The remainder of this section discusses market deﬁnitions, the mea-
surement of entry and exit, and the construction of market-level variables.
8.3.1 Deﬁning Markets and Market Participation
Throughout this chapter, we focus our attention on small and isolated
geographic areas so that we can better deﬁne the market served, similar in
spirit to the approach taken by Bresnahan and Reiss (1989, 1991). We ﬁrst
identiﬁed a set of cities and towns that are geographically distinct from
large population centers. From this list of potential markets, we kept only
those locales with populations of less than 50,000 and consistent place
coding in the Census of Services over time. Our markets include 754 incor-
porated places that vary in population from 2,500 to 50,000 people, and
are, on average, larger than the locales used by Bresnahan and Reiss. All
754 geographic areas had a dental practice present in at least one year; but
because they require a larger population to sustain a practice, only 689 of
the geographic areas had a chiropractic practice present.
The measure of entry used in this chapter is the entry of an establishment
into one of these geographic markets. An entrant in a market is deﬁned as
an establishment that is not producing in market m in period t but is pro-
ducing in market m in period t   5 (the next Census year).7 An exit is simi-
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6. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) discuss the measurement issues involved in constructing 
the LBD.
7. Almost all entering and exiting establishments in these data represent establishment
birth and deaths. However, some establishments in the data switch geographic codes over timelarly deﬁned as an establishment that is in market min period tand is not in
that market in period t 5. For each market mand in each time interval, we
construct the number of entering establishments (NEmt), the number of ex-
iting establishments (NXmt), and the number of establishments (Nmt). The
data allow us to measure entry and exit for ﬁve time intervals (1977–1982,
1982–1987, 1987–1992, 1992–1997, and 1997–2002) and for 754 geographic
markets, yielding a data set of 3,770 market-time observations.
To give a sense of how entry and exit varies across the markets in our
data, ﬁgures 8.1–8.3 show the cumulative density of the number of estab-
lishments, number of entrants, and number of exiting establishments. The
distribution for dentists is shifted to the right in all three panels, indicating
that the number of oﬃces per market, as well as the number of entering and
exiting producers, is larger for dentists compared to chiropractors. The
graph also shows that many of our markets have a relatively small number
of producers. In fact, the majority of markets support less than three 
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and such geographic market switching can generate entry and exit under our deﬁnitions. We
restrict certain types of these geographic market switching. In particular, establishments
within a county will sometimes switch between a rest of county place code and a place code
identifying a city. We do not allow these within-county changes in geographic coding to gen-
erate entry and exit. In these cases, we ﬁx the place code to the code that identiﬁes the city and
then treat the establishment as continuing in that location.
Fig. 8.1 Cumulative distribution of the number of dentists and chiropractors in lo-
cal markets
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.Fig. 8.2 Cumulative distribution of the number of entering dentists and chiroprac-
tors in local markets
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.
Fig. 8.3 Cumulative distribution of the number of exiting dentists and chiroprac-
tors in local markets
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.chiropractors and less than eight dentists. One diﬀerence between these
two industries is that the number of chiropractic oﬃces grew rapidly over
the period of analysis while dentists experienced slower growth. The aver-
age number of dentists oﬃces in our markets grew by 16.5 percent whereas
the growth in chiropractors oﬃces increased by 142.5 percent. Still, the
number of chiropractic oﬃces was only 31.5 percent of the number of den-
tists oﬃces by the end of the sample period.
8.3.2 Market-Level Variables
Throughout the analysis, three variables are used to characterize market
structure: the number of establishments (discussed previously); the average
size, measured as real revenue, of producers; and the average labor pro-
ductivity of producers. We use the data from the Census of Services to mea-
sure the average revenue of practices in a market and deﬂate this by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Average labor productivity for a market is
similarly constructed by taking real revenue of a practice, dividing it by the
establishment’s total employment, and then averaging across all producers
in the market.8
Our empirical models use three variables to capture diﬀerences in de-
mand and cost conditions across markets. To control for demand diﬀer-
ences, we include the population of the geographic market and per capita
income. Population in a market (Smt) has been the main proxy used to mea-
sure market size in most previous studies of entry. Population ﬁgures on in-
corporated places are obtained from the Census Bureau’s series on popu-
lation estimates, but we interpolate the data for our places in some earlier
years from the Decennial Census when population estimates are unavail-
able. The real per capita income variable (PCImt) from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis is measured at the county level and deﬂated by the CPI. To
control for cost diﬀerences, we construct the average real wage (Wmt) paid
to workers employed in the health practitioners’ oﬃces (NAICS 62111-
621399) in the county, again deﬂating by the national CPI. Because we do
not have local price deﬂators, variation in the wage and income variables
will also reﬂect price-level diﬀerences across geographic markets, which are
likely to be important in these data.
The dynamic entry model from section 8.2.2 implies that the history of
market structure matters in determining current market structure. Two
variables are used to control for history in our empirical models—the
lagged or beginning period number of ﬁrms in a market and the lagged or
beginning period number of potential entrants (NPEmt) that were present
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8. In these industries, dentists and chiropractors are the main generators of revenue, but if
the legal form of organization is a sole proprietor or a partnership these owner-practitioners
will not be counted in employment. To account for this omission, we modify total employ-
ment at an establishment for sole proprietors by adding one employee and for partnerships by
adding two employees.in the market. The number of potential entrants into a geographic market
in a time period is equal to the maximum number of diﬀerent establish-
ments that appear in the market over time minus the current number of es-
tablishments in operation. The rationale behind this deﬁnition is that in
each geographic market we observe all potential entrants being active at
some point in time. In each time period the pool of potential entrants is the
set of establishments that are not currently active.
A main focus of prior work has been an examination of how the number
of ﬁrms in a market varies with market size. Figure 8.4 graphs this rela-
tionship for dentists and chiropractors using a locally weighted regres-
sion.9 Larger markets support a larger number of practices in both indus-
tries and, as noted previously, the number of dental practices per capita is
signiﬁcantly greater than chiropractic practices per capita. Our largest
markets support in excess of twenty dentists per market while for chiro-
practors the largest markets only support about ﬁve producers. Since chi-
ropractic oﬃces also have lower revenue, on average, than dentist oﬃces,
the data reﬂect the fact that per capita demand for chiropractic services is
much less than dental services. Figures 8.5 and 8.6 graph the relationship
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9. Figures 8.1 through 8.9 are produced using STATA’s lowess command with a bandwidth
of .3 and the default weighting procedure. The lowess command estimates a weighted regres-
sion at each observation in the data using nearby data points to construct a smoothed value
of the dependent variable conditional on the x variable.
Fig. 8.4 Number of producers by market size
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.Fig. 8.5 Number of entrants by market size
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.
Fig. 8.6 Number of exits by market size
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.between market population and the number of entering and exiting estab-
lishments. The same general patterns hold—there are a greater number of
entering and exiting dentists per capita than chiropractors.
8.4 Empirical Model of Entry, Exit, and Number of Firms
The dynamic model of section 8.2.2 implies that the number of entering
and exiting ﬁrms is a function of the market characteristics that aﬀect cur-
rent and future proﬁts, the distribution of scrap values and entry costs, and
the number of ﬁrms and potential entrants that are present. In this section
we specify the estimating equations that we will apply to the market-level
data for dentists and chiropractors.
The theoretical model from section 8.2.2 speciﬁes the number of enter-
ing and exiting ﬁrms as binomial random variables. We could specify the
probabilities of entry and exit as functions of the observable state variables
and unknown parameters and estimate them using maximum likelihood.
The estimation of entry probabilities depends critically on the measure-
ment of the number of potential entrants (NPEmt) and this variable is diﬃ-
cult to measure accurately. Instead, we choose to model the mean number
of entering and exiting ﬁrms directly and use NPEas one explanatory vari-
able. If it is measured poorly it may still be possible to determine if the other
state variables are signiﬁcant determinants of entry ﬂows. Since the entry
and exit ﬂows are count variables, we use an extension of the Poisson
model. Given the panel of 754 geographic markets for ﬁve ﬁve-year peri-
ods, we specify the ﬂows of entering and exiting practices using a negative
binomial regression model.
The mean number of exiting plants is a function of the market-level state
variables and the number of potential entrants:
(4) E(NXmt|Nmt 1, Zmt 1, NPEmt 1)
  exp [ 0    1 log Smt 1    2 log (PCImt 1 )    3 log W mt 1
   4Nmt 1    5NPEmt 1    jDmj ]
where the Dmj is a set of four dummy variables to distinguish the ﬁve time
periods in the data. The variables are all speciﬁed at the start of the time
period (t– 1) and the number of exits is measured over the time interval t– 1
to t. The negative binomial model generalizes the Poisson model to allow
the variance of the distribution to be greater than the mean using the spec-
iﬁcation:
(5) Var (NXmt)   E(NXmt)[1    x E(NXmt)] .
This introduces one new parameter  X, which is referred to as the overdis-
persion parameter. The Poisson model is the special case where  X   0.
A similar equation is speciﬁed for the mean entry ﬂow:
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  exp [ 0    1 log Smt 1    2 log (PCImt 1 )    3 log Wmt 1
   4Nmt 1    5 NPEmt 1    jDmj ]
where NE is measured over the time interval t –1 to t. We also allow for
overdispersion in the entry model using the speciﬁcation in equation (5). It
is important to recognize that the coeﬃcients in these entry and exit ﬂow
regressions are combinations of proﬁt function, sunk cost, and entry cost
parameters, and these underlying structural parameters are not separately
identiﬁed.
Combining the entry and exit models also provides a way to describe the
number of ﬁrms in year t that is consistent with the dynamic model of en-
try and exit. The number of ﬁrms in year t can be written as Nmt   Nmt–1  
NEmt – NXmt. Using equations (4) and (6) for NE and NX we can write Nmt
as a function of the state variables, lagged number of ﬁrms, and number of
potential entrants:
(7) E(Nmt | Nmt 1, Zmt 1, NPEmt 1)
  exp [ 0    1 log Smt 1    2 log (PCImt 1)    3 log Wmt 1
   4Nmt 1    5 NPEmt 1    jDmj].
Notice that this diﬀers from the speciﬁcation of N from the two-period
models because it depends on lagged N and the number of potential en-
trants NPE. One way to distinguish the two-period and fully dynamic
models is by whether these two variables are signiﬁcant in the model for the
number of ﬁrms.
We have estimated both negative binomial and Poisson models and in
most cases the amount of overdispersion is relatively small and the coeﬃ-
cient estimates are similar. To simplify the discussion, we report only the
negative binomial estimates of equations (4) through (7) in the next section.
8.5 Empirical Evidence on Entry, Exit, and Market Structure
8.5.1 Market Structure and Market Size
Before turning to the regression analysis, we present graphs showing the
relationship between market size and market structure for our health ser-
vice industries. Figures 8.7 through 8.9 depict a set of locally-weighted re-
gressions for three variables that describe features of our local markets—
population per ﬁrm (S/N), average revenue per ﬁrm, and average ﬁrm
productivity. These variables, measured in logs, are plotted against log S in
the market. For both industries, average revenue per producer and average
labor productivity rise as market size increases, though there are some
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Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.
Fig. 8.8 Log of average revenue per producer by market size
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.diﬀerences in the shape of this relationship between the industries. The rise
in average revenue and average labor productivity is greatest for small mar-
kets and then ﬂattens out in the larger markets for dentists. However, for
chiropractors, the rise in average revenues and labor productivity is most
pronounced in mid-size markets. Recall that small markets support very
few chiropractors and it is only as markets become mid-sized that we are
likely to see multiple chiropractors operating. These increases in average
revenue and average labor productivity with market size are consistent
with previous empirical research. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) ﬁnd
that average sales per producer rises with market size and Syverson (2004)
reports that productivity is higher in larger markets. Both interpret these
patterns as consistent with more intense competition in larger markets.
The relationship between log(S/N) and log S shown in ﬁgure 8.7 does not
provide a uniform picture across the industries. For chiropractors, popula-
tion per producer rises as market size increases. Again, under the condi-
tions described in Berry and Reiss (2006), this pattern is consistent with
more competition in larger markets. Alternatively, dentists show a much
more muted rise in average population per practice as market size in-
creases, suggesting less of a competitive eﬀect.
To control for other variables, table 8.1 reports the coeﬃcients from re-
gressions of the number of producers, the average revenue of practices, and
average labor productivity in a market on our demand and cost variables.
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Fig. 8.9 Log of average labor productivity
Source: Authors’ own calculations, Census of Services 1977–2002.The regression of the number of producers is estimated using the negative
binomial count data model for comparability with the dynamic model re-
sults that are reported below. The log average revenue and log labor pro-
ductivity models are estimated using ordinary least squares, and all mod-
els contain year dummies.
The coeﬃcient on market population in the regression for number of es-
tablishments (N), is an estimate of the elasticity of N with respect to S and
is less than one for both industries, .830 for dentists and .671 for chiro-
practors. If a competitive eﬀect is present, then the coeﬃcient on market
size should be less than one. As observed in ﬁgure 8.7, chiropractic services
appear to have a somewhat stronger competitive eﬀect. One reason for this
diﬀerence between these industries is that, compared to dentists, a much
higher percentage of the markets served by chiropractors have two or fewer
producers (see ﬁg. 8.1). Bresnahan and Reiss found that for their industries
the competitive eﬀect was dissipated by the time there were three ﬁrms in
the market. Given the relatively small number of chiropractors operating
in many of the markets, it is more likely to ﬁnd deviations from competitive
outcomes in this industry.
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Table 8.1 Results for market structure regressions
Dentists Chiropractors
Number Log average Log labor  Number  Log average  Log labor 
of ﬁrmsa revenue productivity of ﬁrmsa revenue productivity
Constant –5.593 1.116 1.825 –11.265 –.821 .733
(.472) (.423) (.274) (.773) (.695) (.534)
Log market population .830 .108 .053 .671 .137 .074
(.013) (.010) (.007) (.020) (.019) (.014)
Log per capita income .416 .287 .132 1.032 .461 .230
(.051) (.044) (.028) (.084) (.078) (.059)
Log market wage .733 .413 .212 .122 .278 .187
(.048) (.042) (.028) (.074) (.067) (.053)
yr = 1982 .141 –.079 –.241 .266 –.071 –.199
(.022) (.018) (.012) (.044) (.037) (.030)
yr = 1987 .026 .005 –.220 .420 .125 –.042
(.023) (.019) (.012) (.042) (.034) (.026)
yr = 1992 –.015 .153 –.163 .572 .208 –.020
(.024) (.019) (.012) (.041) (.032) (.026)
yr = 1997 –.132 .253 –.140 .597 .082 –.106
(.026) (.024) (.016) (.044) (.035) (.028)
Alpha .054 — — .017 — —
(.004) (.012)
N 3,762 3,740 3,739 3,762 3,052 3,052
R-square .189 .299 .212 .145 .113 .066
aUse negative binomial model for the number of ﬁrms. Remaining regressions are OLS.The positive relationship between market size and both revenue and la-
bor productivity in these industries can also be interpreted as evidence that
a competitive eﬀect of entry is present. The estimated elasticity of average
revenue is .108 in dentists and .137 in chiropractic services. Although these
elasticities are somewhat greater than those reported by Campbell and
Hopenhayn (2005) using similar models, it is consistent with their argu-
ment that a competitive eﬀect will result in larger ﬁrms in larger markets.
The larger magnitudes found here may reﬂect the fact that the markets used
in this study are generally smaller and thus more likely to be aﬀected by
competitive pressure from entry. Syverson’s (2004) model predicts that pro-
ductivity will be higher in larger markets due to a more intense selection
eﬀect, and the results are consistent with his ﬁndings. The elasticity of av-
erage productivity with respect to market size is .053 and .074 in the den-
tist and chiropractor industries, respectively.
The other demand variable, the log of per capita income, has a positive
elasticity in all three market structure regressions for both industries.
These results probably reﬂect the fact that as incomes rise a greater share
of the population uses the services, and/or consumers use the service more
intensively, resulting in higher market demand, more ﬁrms, and higher av-
erage revenue. The latter eﬀect could also arise from increased product dif-
ferentiation and higher prices in wealthier markets. The wage variable has
the expected positive sign in the average revenue and productivity regres-
sions, since revenue must rise to cover higher costs, but the positive coeﬃ-
cient in the regressions for the number of producers is unexpected. This
suggests that the market wage variable in these regressions not only picks
diﬀerences in factor costs across locations but also diﬀerences in cost-of-
living. Markets with higher cost of living will have higher output prices and
the net eﬀect of these input and output price changes on proﬁtability is am-
biguous. Finally, the alpha parameter estimated from the negative bino-
mial models of the number of producers indicates that overdispersion is
present in the model for dentists but not for chiropractors.
8.5.2 Entry and Exit
The regression speciﬁcations in table 8.1 are motivated by the two-
period models of entry summarized in section 8.2.1. The empirical results
for the eﬀect of market size are similar to other empirical studies using this
framework and these have generally been interpreted as reﬂecting a com-
petitive eﬀect of entry. The dynamic model of section 8.2.2 provides a
diﬀerent starting point for the modeling of market structure and indicates
that the lagged number of ﬁrms and number of potential entrants are 
determinants of entry and exit ﬂows and thus current market structure.
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 provide results for models that include these additional
explanatory variables.
Table 8.2 reports the results of negative binomial models using the num-
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teresting ﬁnding in the table is the role played by the controls for the num-
ber of ﬁrms and the number of potential entrants at the beginning of the
period. These regressions are reported in the even-numbered columns in
the table. The model in section 8.2.2 implies that an increase in N should
reduce the proﬁt stream from being in the market and so reduce the num-
ber of entrants (NE) and increase the number of exits (NX). The model im-
plies an additional eﬀect on exit, holding the proﬁt stream ﬁxed, because
an increase in the number of ﬁrms making the continuation decision means
that the expected number of ﬁrms observing a scrap value larger than the
value of remaining in the industry (and thus choosing to exit) will rise.
Overall, there should be a positive correlation between N and NX and a
negative correlation between Nand NE. The predicted positive correlation
between N and NX observed for both industries and the coeﬃcients, .050
in dentists and .211 in chiropractors, are highly signiﬁcant. The correlation
can reﬂect either, or both, of the exit linkages in the model and it is not pos-
sible using these regressions to identify the separate contribution of each
322 Timothy Dunne, Shawn D. Klimek, Mark J. Roberts, and Daniel Yi Xu
Table 8.2 Models of the number of entrants and exits (negative binomial)
Dentists Chiropractors
Entry Entry Exit Exit Entry Entry Exit Exit
Constant –6.331 –2.019 –7.678 –3.112 –9.388 –4.144 –5.403 2.711
(1.120) (.869) (.905) (.769) (1.179) (1.038) (1.674) (1.301)
Log market population .839 .338 .847 .300 .684 .295 .510 .106
(.027) (.032) (.025) (.031) (.032) (.043) (.044) (.044)
Log per capita income .336 .069 .487 .208 .700 .233 .309 –.428
(.120) (.094) (.099) (.083) (.131) (.118) (.186) (.143)
Log market wage .925 .408 .698 .209 .416 .120 .310 .011
(.090) (.077) (.087) (.081) (.116) (.110) (.163) (.134)
yr = 1982 –.344 –.307 .024 –.057 .205 .274 –.073 –.178
(.040) (.035) (.042) (.039) (.058) (.061) (.077) (.071)
yr = 1987 –.723 –.578 –.214 –.218 .090 .324 –.130 –.240
(.043) (.038) (.043) (.040) (.059) (.061) (.079) (.073)
yr = 1992 –.689 –.535 –.260 –.250 .124 .475 .185 –.051
(.048) (.040) (.047) (.042) (.065) (.069) (.075) (.072)
yr = 1997 –.751 –.490 –.234 –.149 .183 .657 .415 .141
(.053) (.045) (.049) (.044) (.063) (.069) (.081) (.079)
N(t) — .007 — .050 — –.005 — .211
(.003) (.003) (.011) (.012)
Potential entrants — .043 — .004 — .115 — .004
NPE(t) (.003) (.002) (.010) (.007)
A1pha .187 .062 .090 .005 .164 .088 .119 .004
(.019) (.010) (.014) (.009) (.035) (.022) (.057) (.015)
N 3,762 3,762 3,740 3,740 3,762 3,762 3,052 3,052
R-square .128 .189 .130 .176 .080 .148 .053 .134mechanism. The predicted negative relationship between N and NE is not
observed in the dentist industry and is observed, but is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, for chiropractors. Both coeﬃcients are small when compared with
the impact of an increase in the number of potential entrants, and this may
reﬂect the second-order impact of an increase in N aﬀecting the number of
entrants through its eﬀect on the value of entering.
The dynamic model predicts that an increase in the number of potential
entrants NPE lowers the discounted value of expected future proﬁts by in-
creasing the expected number of ﬁrms operating in the future. This will
lead to less entry and more exit. It has a second impact on the number of
entrants. An increase in the number of potential entrants, holding the
proﬁt stream ﬁxed, will increase the expected number of ﬁrms that draw an
entry cost less than the value of entering and thus choose to enter. So the
correlation between NPEand NXshould be positive, while the correlation
between NPE and NE is ambiguous. The positive relationship between
NPE and NX is observed, the coeﬃcient is .004 for both industries but is
only statistically signiﬁcant for dentists. The estimated relationship be-
tween NPE and NE is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, .043 in dentists
and .115 in chiropractors. This suggests that the direct eﬀect of an increase
in the size of the pool of potential entrants is more important for the entry
ﬂow than the indirect or secondary eﬀect this has on the future proﬁt
stream. Overall, the importance of Nand NPEas control variables in these
regressions provides some support for the dynamic framework.
The second set of results that is of interest in table 8.2 concerns the co-
eﬃcients on the demand and cost variables and how these are aﬀected
when lagged market structure variables are included. In models that do not
control for N and NPE, reported in the odd-numbered columns of table
8.2, the coeﬃcients on the demand and cost variables are all positive, indi-
cating that markets with larger population, per capita income, and wage
rates (or price levels) have more producer turnover, that is, both higher en-
try and exit. Unlike the regressions in table 8.1, there is no competition in-
terpretation linked to these results. When N and NPE are included in the
regressions the magnitude of each of these coeﬃcients is substantially re-
duced. For example, comparing the ﬁrst two columns, the coeﬃcient on the
market size variable falls from .839 to .338 when the two variables are in-
cluded. This is true in all the entry and exit models and suggests that any
conclusions we draw based on the relationship between the demand and
cost variables and market structure may be sensitive to whether we base the
empirical model on the two-period, long-run equilibrium model or an ex-
plicitly dynamic one.
To explore this last point further we reestimate the market structure
models reported in table 8.1, but now include the lagged number of ﬁrms
and potential entrants as additional control variables. These ﬁndings are
reported in table 8.3. First, the lagged number of ﬁrms and potential en-
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ﬁrms (columns 1 and 4). The importance of these variables is one way to
discriminate between the dynamic models that allow for the possibility of
hysteresis in market structure, and the two-period models that do not. In
addition, for both industries, the other estimated coeﬃcients in these two
columns are sensitive to the inclusion of these market history variables.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcients on population, per capital income, and
the wage rate all drop markedly in comparison to those reported in table
8.1. Of particular interest is the eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of the market size
variable, since these have been the focus of most attention in the empirical
literature. In the dentist industry, the coeﬃcient on market population
drops from .830 in table 8.1 to .316 in table 8.3. The corresponding coeﬃ-
cients for chiropractors are .671 and .296. While all the coeﬃcients are sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent than one and would, if the two-period model was taken
literally, imply a competitive eﬀect of entry, the magnitude of the eﬀect is
clearly very diﬀerent between model speciﬁcations. This raises questions
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Table 8.3 Results for market structure regressions with history variables
Dentists Chiropractors
Number  Log average Log labor  Number  Log average Log labor
of ﬁrmsa revenue productivity of ﬁrmsa revenue productivity
Constant –.928 1.313 1.871 –4.049 .807 1.482
(.365) (.389) (.249) (.719) (.786) (.578)
Log market population .316 .074 .033 .296 .092 .065
(.017) (.018) (.012) (.030) (.026) (.020)
Log per capita income .119 .286 .115 .378 .278 .119
(.039) (.042) (.027) (.079) (.086) (.063)
Log market wage .305 .298 .157 –.046 .317 .212
(.039) (.038) (.025) (.067) (.070) (.054)
yr = 1987 –.089 .103 .035 .173 .188 .152
(.017) (.018) (.011) (.033) (.040) (.030)
yr = 1992 –.116 .251 .092 .270 .239 .173
(.018) (.019) (.012) (.035) (.041) (.031)
yr = 1997 –.153 .366 .124 .266 .119 .109
(.021) (.022) (.014) (.038) (.044) (.034)
N (t – 1) .042 –.014 –.009 .155 .063 –.003
(.002) (.020) (.012) (.013) (.023) (.018)
Potential entrants .008 .057 .034 .032 .021 .033
NPE (t – 1) (.001) (.013) (.008) (.005) (.019) (.015)
Alpha .000 — — .012 — —
(.009)
N 3,010 2,945 2,945 3,010 2,147 2,144
R-square .282 .326 .183 .222 .104 .072
aUse negative binomial model for the number of ﬁrms. Remaining regressions are OLS.about how to interpret the estimated relationship between the size of a
market and the number of ﬁrms.
In contrast to the model of the number of ﬁrms, there is little systematic
relationship between the lagged market structure variables and either the
average revenue or labor productivity variables. The most signiﬁcant cor-
relations appear between the number of potential entrants and the average
revenue and productivity variables for dentists. Still, the results in table 8.3
suggest that the lagged market structure variables are determinants of cur-
rent market structure, particularly the number of ﬁrms in the market, as
implied by the dynamic model of entry and exit. This only serves to further
complicate the interpretation of the regression coeﬃcients in this type of
model, since they now reﬂect much more than a possible competitive eﬀect
of entry.
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter utilizes U. S. Census micro data to study patterns of pro-
ducer dynamics in two health service industries, dentists and chiroprac-
tors. The analysis is guided by studies in the industrial organization litera-
ture that quantify the relationship between market size and market
structure, where the latter is measured in several ways, including the num-
ber of ﬁrms, the average size of ﬁrms, and the level of productivity. The
framework is extended to incorporate the analysis of entry and exit ﬂows.
Recent models of producer dynamics stress the diﬀerent decisions faced by
incumbent ﬁrms and potential entrants. In particular, the existence of a
sunk entry cost implies that the decision of an incumbent producer to re-
main in a market diﬀers in fundamental ways from the decision of a new
ﬁrm to enter the market. One implication of these recent models is that en-
try ﬂows, exit ﬂows, and current market structure depend not only on cur-
rent demand and cost conditions but also on the history of participation
decisions.
In order to empirically examine the determinants of entry, exit, and mar-
ket structure, we use census data for 754 small, geographically isolated
markets for dentists and chiropractor services and follow these markets
over a twenty-ﬁve-year time span. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant role for both the
past number of ﬁrms and the number of potential entrants as determinants
of current market structure, and this is consistent with the dynamic model
of entry and exit we rely on. Our empirical ﬁndings also show that as mar-
ket size increases, the number of ﬁrms rises less than proportionally, ﬁrm
average size increases, and average productivity in the market increases.
All of these patterns replicate ﬁndings of other studies that have been used
to infer that markets become more competitive as they increase in size.
However, we ﬁnd the magnitudes of these correlations, particularly for the
number of ﬁrms, are sensitive to the inclusion of the market history vari-
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sions as revealing much about the competitive structure of the market.
The relationship between the size of a market, the magnitude of barriers
to entry including the size of entry costs, and the competitiveness of a mar-
ket is an issue of long-standing interest in industrial organization. Changes
in market size aﬀect ﬁrm proﬁtability but also generate ﬂows of entry and
exit that also impact proﬁtability. These entry and exit ﬂows are determined,
in part, by the magnitude of sunk entry costs, which are very hard to mea-
sure and control for in empirical work. The correlations between market
size and the number of ﬁrms, entry ﬂows, and exit ﬂows will reﬂect the in-
teraction of these entry barriers, magnitude of competition in the market,
and expected future changes in market conditions and proﬁtability. In
Dunne et al. (2008) we utilize U. S. Census micro data to estimate an em-
pirical model of entry, exit, and proﬁtability to identify these separate com-
ponents of market structure and performance. One key to future empirical
work in the area of producer dynamics is micro data that can track the evo-
lution of ﬁrms and markets over time. Producer data sets that cover a
broader range of sectors, countries, and time periods are a crucial compo-
nent of future research on the sources and impacts of producer dynamics.
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